A Campaign Argument

The following is the complete text of an editorial published by the Republican

Herald-Tribune of Manhattan:

THE 1924 CHOICE

"A vote for LaFollette is a vote for Bryan.

"A vote for Davis is a vote for Bryan.

"A vote for Coolidge is a vote for Coolidge."

This is a striking presentation of an argument that is being used in many parts of the country, especially in the East. It is being used by both major parties. The Democratic version of it is:

"A vote for LaFollette is a vote for throwing the election into Congress.

"A vote for Coolidge is a vote for throwing the election into Congress.

"A vote for Davis is a vote for Davis."

In both cases it is being used to excite fear of what may come if no candidate has a majority in the Electoral College. The Republicans assert that Coolidge is the only candidate who has the chance of such a majority. The Republicans openly hold out the prospect that the "calamity," which would ensue from a failure of the Electoral College to elect, would be a deadlock in the House, with the prospect of Bryan being chosen Vice President in the Senate, and automatically becoming President when the House found itself unable to give a majority either to Coolidge, LaFollette or Davis. Certain Democrats, although of course they cannot hold up their own vice presidential candidate as a threat, know that some voters regard him in that light, and are not unwilling to take advantage of the fact.

What is the real force of this argument? The explanation of how the election might go to Bryan was originally an interesting plaything of an idea, but now it is being developed into a campaign bogy. It runs thus:

If the Electoral College fails to give any one a majority, then the House of Representatives is to choose a President from the three leading candidates, whom no one doubts will be Coolidge, Davis, LaFollette. For the purpose of such an election, each state delegation in the House casts one vote, determined by the majority of its members. Twenty-five delegation votes are necessary for a choice. The Democrats would have 19; the Republicans 24; and five are tied and could not vote. Besides, Wisconsin and perhaps some other nominally Republican states would vote for LaFollette. At any rate, no one would have a majority. Assuming that this condition would endure to Mar. 4, the man whom the Senate had chosen Vice President would then become President. The Senate choice is confined to the two leaders--Dawes and Bryan. Since Dawes is repulsive to the Progressives, they would probably unite with the Democrats to elect Bryan.

This is a novel and beautiful hypothesis. But the practical chance of matters falling out so is extremely small. In the House sit a group of normal politicians. Is it possible that they would forego the chance of naming a President?

To be sure, there would have to be considerable trading before there were shifts, but there is profit in trading. Those representatives who traded their votes might get valuable patronage or other considerations in return. Many of the members will be lame ducks, and will wish to provide for their own futures. In the five delegations that are tied, if one man in each can be won over (at a price to be sure), the tie will be undone and the delegations will vote, perhaps decisively. The Democratic Convention was deadlocked for two weeks. But if the House fails to elect a President, it will be deadlocked for about seven. Something would surely be done, and almost as surely the cry of "corruption," would be raised--the same cry that followed the election of 1824, when Henry Clay threw his support to John Q. Adams, and following Adams's election in the House, was made Secretary of State.

The question of whom the House would elect is a matter of conjecture. Probably it would not be Coolidge. Both Democrats and Progressives are united against him. These two groups would presumably make some sort of working agreement such as they made on the tax bill. Whether Davis would be chosen and LaFollette promised favors, legislative and executive, or whether the reverse would be the case, cannot be said. But some practical arrangement would almost certainly be made.

Is it possible that Congressmen will forego the credit and the profit of naming a President--freely hand all that over to the Senate?