International Candor

At the suggestion of Premier Poincare of France, an exchange of letters between him and Prime Minister Macdonald of England was published.

This is the second time this year that Anglo-French correspondence has been published (TIME, Feb. 11). On the present occasion the letters were more specific and not less frank. Premier Macdonald stated that France's maintenance of large military and aerial forces is not understood in Britain; he also made a plea for Anglo-French co-oeperation to prepare Europe so that the U. S. can be induced to help in general reconstruction on that continent. Premier Poincare's reply contained a justification of France's policy. He made a plea for peace and said that Anglo-French unity was a prerequisite to that end.

Points from Premier Macdonald's letter:

Feb. 21, 1924.

My dear Premier:

I desire in my present letter to prepare the way for a more complete mutual understanding by reciting without reserve the difficulties by which I am faced and the manner in which I myself envisage the situation. . . .

It is widely felt in England that, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, France is endeavoring to create a situation which gains for it what it failed to get during the Allied Peace negotiations. The view of this section of my countrymen is that that policy can only perpetuate the uncertainty and dangers of a condition not of peace, but of war.

There were many people in France who imagined that with the complete defeat of Germany they would automatically be freed forever. . . . Some thought that in order to attain absolute security the frontiers of France should be extended to the Rhine.

They were disappointed in this expectation; they were offered instead a joint guarantee by Great Britain and the United States of America. With the abstention of America this offer itself lapsed, and the French people have since, with some justification, been seeking for other and more tangible safeguards to take its place.

In regard to reparations also the French public have suffered disappointment....

The position of this country is entirely different. Our security on land and sea remains unmenaced, but our economic existence has been gravely endangered, owing not to the inability of Germany to pay a certain sum in reparation, but to the acute and persistent dislocation of the markets of Europe occasioned mainly by the uncertainty in the relations between France and Germany, the continued economic chaos in Germany, shown so clearly by the violent fluctuations in the value of currency, and the ultimate uncertainty of the relations between France and ourselves.

People in this country regard with anxiety what appears to them to be the determination of France to ruin Germany and to dominate the Continent without consideration of our reasonable interests and the future consequences to a European settlement; they feel apprehensive of the large military and aerial establishments maintained not only in eastern but also in western France; they are disturbed by the interest shown by your Government in the military organization of the new States in Central Europe, and finally, they question why all these activities should be financed by the French Government in disregard of the fact that the British taxpayer has to find upwards of -L-30,000,000 a year as interest upon loans raised in America, and that our taxpayers have also to find large sums to pay interest on the debt of France to us, to meet which France herself has as yet neither made nor propounded, so far as they can see, any sacrifice equivalent to their own.

Such popular sentiments, erroneous though they may be, are factors which both you and I are bound to take into consideration. . . I see little prospect of our being able to attain any agreement in such matters unless we are first able by frank and courageous discussion to achieve some unanimity in regard to the essential purposes to which these problems are merely subsidiary. . . .

I repeat, my dear Premier, the condition of Europe can only, I feel convinced, be remedied by joint action between France and England, undertaken with full sympathy for their respective requirements and with wise regard for the interests of the world at large. For such cooeperatiion I am fully prepared. I am, etc.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

Points from Premier Poincare's letter:

Feb. 25, 1924.

My dear Prime Minister:

It is with keen pleasure I have read your very frank and friendly letter. . . .

No more than you, do I wish ... to assure you that I am ready to begin with you examination of these great outstanding problems and that I shall enter upon this examination in that spirit of conciliation and loyalty with which you yourself are animated. . . .

Ever since the signature of the peace treaty France has been obsessed by two legitimate preoccupations. She aims at the restoration of her material losses and at the definite establishment of her security. . .

Those of your fellow-countrymen who believe that France dreams, or has dreamed, of political or economic annihilation of Germany are mistaken. As the creditor of Germany. France is not so mad as to wish to reduce her debtor to poverty. It is in the interests of France that Germany should work, produce and recuperate. . . .

No reasonable Frenchman has ever dreamed of annexing a particle of German territory nor of turning a single German into a French citizen. At no time, either during the peace negotiations or since, has any pretension of this nature been put forward.

France, who fought side by side with England for the liberty of nations, is as incapable as England of infringing on this liberty. Apart from Alsace, we have never claimed the Rhine as a frontier. We have only asked that Germany should no longer be in a position to use the Rhine as a military base in fresh attacks against France. We have asked that in general interests of peace that river should form a barrier against aggression. . . .

Are there really Englishmen who suppose that France would be capable of making fratricidal preparations against their country? Our military and aerial establishments are exclusively designed to defend us against attempted German revenge. We have suffered invasion often enough to be compelled to provide in advance against it.

If our establishments are scattered throughout our territory, it is because our administrative organization and our mobilization requirements do not allow us to concentrate them in the East, but our army and our air force are no more signs of defiance to England than the aerial and maritime fleets of Britain are in your view a threat to France.

Our policy toward the States of the Little Entente has always been of the same peaceful character. ... In that there is nothing to give umbrage to England. . . . Moreover, in lending to the Allied States of Central Europe resources necessary for their defense, we have done nothing which could impoverish ourselves or prevent us from paying our own debts, since the loans to which we have agreed were only agreed to in exchange for positive pledges. . . .

We occupied the Ruhr in order to induce Germany to settle with us and to conquer the stubborn resistance of the German industrial magnates. This method of pressure will cease, as we have announced, on the day when Germany pays off her debts.

On the other hand, the occupation of the Rhineland will come to an end when the conditions laid down in the treaty have been fulfilled and our security is guaranteed. . . .

We owe it to civilization to remain united. Since our two Governments are conscious of this duty it is impossible that we should not act together to carry it out.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) POINCARe

The press of Britain was of the opinion that nothing had been gained by the exchange of letters. The French press stressed the divergence of views which exists between the two countries. Both were, however, united in welcoming the candor with which the two countries are conducting negotiations.

France, on the eve of an electoral campaign, believed that Poincare's opponents will make considerable political capital out of the letters; but the supporters of Poincare emphasize the fact that it was the Premier who proposed their publication.